SMO v TikTok judgment

Some interesting remarks/statements – additional info/comments enclosed in brackets () and italics- are extracted from the Judgment:

‘This is a pre-action application for anonymity on behalf of a child claimant in an intended claim for breach of privacy‘.

‘The papers explained that the urgency stemmed from the fact that the end of the Brexit transition period on 31 December 2020 will bring about changes in the law which are, or are at least said to be, relevant to the intended claim. One change relates to the GDPR. It is said that under the law as it stands before the end of the period this Court has jurisdiction over that aspect of the claim and over the Second Intended Defendant, which is a company registered in England and Wales. The position from 1 January 20201 is “less clear”; jurisdiction will be decided on the basis of the common law rules “which may prejudice the ability of the claimant to bring the claim and/or defend any jurisdictional challenge brought by the Intended Defendants (i.e. defendants outside UK. What about the UK GDPR?)’.

‘Some of the claimant’s paperwork devotes attention to the importance of keeping the claimant’s address a secret. I do not regard that as an issue of particular significance in the context of this case. It is said that its disclosure might give rise to a risk of harm, regardless of the facts of the case, as it would increase the risk of attention from people who intend the claimant serious harm. That appears to me to be unsupported by the evidence. In any event, the claimant’s address is not a weighty aspect of open justice, save in so far as it may lead to the identification of the claimant. The real issue is whether the claimant should be identified. If not, an order for non-disclosure of the address would seem to follow.

‘The common law exceptions did not include the rights or interests of children, other than in the context of wardship. But by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998 there is now, effectively, a statutory exception. The Court must act compatibly with the Convention Rights, including the right to respect for private life protected by Article 8. And Article 6 provides that the general rule of open justice may be departed from
“where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require.” This does not provide any automatic protection for children, regardless of the circumstances: see ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4 [46] (Lord Kerr), ETK v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 439 [19] (Ward LJ). A balance must always be struck, and attention must be paid to the specifics of the individual case, not just generalities. But, as Mr Ciumei QC has pointed out in presenting his client’s case, Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international and domestic instruments require the Court to accord “a primacy of importance” to the best interests of a child: ZH (Tanzania) ibid. (NB: UNCRC Art 3(1) provides the balancing or tipping act when it comes to a child’s privacy rights).

‘It is reasonable to suppose that some of that attention would be focussed on the claimant, if their identity was known. But that is not enough of itself to justify anonymity. Nor is the mere fact that the claimant is 12 years old. It is necessary to consider the nature of the likely attention, and the harm that it could cause. (NB: the likely attention is a trigger for harm).

‘The Commissioner’s witness statement identifies a risk of direct online bullying by other children or users of the TikTok app; and a risk of negative or hostile reactions from social media influencers who might feel their status or earnings were under threat. Both appear to me to be realistic assessments. That is not to say that such behaviour is inevitable, but it is reasonably foreseeable. (NB: risk associated with social media influencers).

‘…the intended claim involves serious criticisms of what may be key aspects of the platform’s (TikTok) mode of operation’

‘I accept the Commissioner’s evidence that children are particularly sensitive to the sort of attention and scrutiny to which she has referred, and that such attention can have a marked and detrimental impact on a child’s mental health, and emotional and educational development. I would characterise the risk of harm as significant‘

‘The assessment of the parents deserves respectful attention.’

‘The main characteristics of importance appear to be age and use of TikTok, and those are shared with all the represented parties. The evidence is that the damages claim will not be peculiar to the circumstances of the claimant, as for instance with a claim to compensate for distress. As in Lloyd v Google, the claim will be for a standard “tariff” figure to compensate the claimant and each of the represented parties for the abstract “loss of control” over personal data. In all likelihood, the main focus of attention for those who wish to understand and scrutinise the workings of the justice system in the intended litigation will be the activities or alleged conduct of TikTok and the role of the defendant companies in its operation’.

‘…if the Court required the claimant to be named that could have a chilling effect on the bringing of claims by children to vindicate their data protection rights. On that footing, the grant of anonymity supports the legitimate and important aim of affording access to justice, and the order is necessary in order to secure the administration of justice.’

I was recently asked (by a non techie) ‘what is twitter?’ I said ; An online system for you and your friends to announce stuff like; ‘I’m off to bed’ or ‘so and so did this/that’ in 140 characters. She didn’t get too excited with my answer!

Anyhow, I did tweet on the Fulbright’s 7th Annual Litigation Trends Survey Report and also IBM’s acquisition of PSS Systems. Both events worth following up to help me connect up the dots – in simple terms from people to process to technology to the court.

In the Survey Report under Electronic Discovery, there was a survey question which asked all respondents; To what extend do you believe the legal guidance regarding a litigant’s duty to preserve electronic and other material in anticipation of an investigation or litigation provides sufficient clarity regarding the scope of material that must be preserved?. The majority of respondents say it is not sufficiently clear.

I wonder whether this question if surveyed again next year will produce the same result. My guess is that it will, even if the UK respondents have grasped the newly amended CPR -PD31B Disclosure of Electronic Documents.
As regards the scope of preservation, the amended PD31B states; ‘As soon as litigation is contemplated, the parties’ legal representatives must notify their clients of the need to preserve disclosable documents. The documents to be preserved include Electronic Documents which would otherwise be deleted in accordance with a document retention policy or otherwise deleted in the ordinary course of business’. Note: not just preserve documents but ‘to preserve disclosable documents’.

The PD31B further provides guidance/direction on ‘what constitute reasonable search’.
Clear enough to connect all the dots as required for ensuring a defensible disposal?

Interestingly there is a question in the Electronic Documents Questionnaire; ‘Do you have a document retention policy? This question seems to be seeking for a simple need to know to a complex policy. Like being asked ‘Do You Twitter?’. Yes/No, so !?

Perhaps a better question is; what kinds of procedures or industry standards/models/practices are in place to address data retention needs? I guess it depends on what the PD31B question is intended to review or capture.
Maybe I will suggest this question (not the PD31B question) for the Fulbright’s 8th Annual Litigation Trends Survey.

Next reminder – to blog about another missing dot which I raised here which appeared to be addressed by folks at CGOC.

A new Practice Direction is introduced to regulate the approach practitioners should take when considering material relevant to a case which is stored electronically. In particular it aims to focus the parties on the sources of electronic material and give guidance to those with less experience of dealing which such issues. This will apply to cases that are or likely to be allocated to the multi-track. The rule change supports the new Practice Direction by confirming that the questionnaire may be treated as a disclosed document. Note: Form N150 is amended to support this change.

A typographical error in PD31B (Question 8 in the questionnaire) has been identified.

Please Note: Question 8 in the questionnaire should read:
8.

If the answer to Question 6 or 7 is yes, state whether (a) attachments to e-mails (b) compressed files (c) embedded files and (d) imaged text will respond to your Keyword Searches or other automated search.

For the contents and details of this Practice Direction click here

What are the challenges of electronic disclosure?

According to the speakers/presenters from the legal world, the challenges are explored by themes which are;

Implications of the latest electronic disclosure developments
Minimising costs associated with eDisclosure
Best practices for managing and preserving electronic information
Developing litigation response strategies
Tips and traps for records management
Litigation strategy
Plus much more…

Not unusual that the legal world have tips and traps for records management.

On the subject of record management, I went to a talk & workshop on records management only last week, conducted by IT/Software professionals. The presenter actually raised some very interesting questions (no tips and traps) for the workshop discussions. One discussion topic was on ‘how to manage across boundaries (inside and outside the organisation)?’

Records management is not a challenge in edisclosure. Records management is already defined by the rules of the games i.e. the CPRs and the various procedures/processes for edisclosure. Ah! Maybe the rules of the games need to be reviewed or re-learnt/re-visited (by lawyers?) or maybe the lawyer’s interpretation of records management is different from what the IT/Software people viewed as records management. For the record, even within the IT/Software community records management have generated heated discussions especially when viewed in terms of knowledge management. Edisclosure is getting ‘relevant/needed/asked for/disputed/evidential’ (or any other keywords searched for) information from knowledge workers to other knowledge workers (or information seekers). Information is knowledge/power.

To me, this is the real challenge. It will involve not only strategy but the art of getting these knowledge workers to really want to collaborate. Who will be responsible for getting the information? Who will be fined? Knowledge workers or their managers?

Maybe the next Lawyer Conference will start to address the real challenges of edisclosure.

Just recently my friend, Martin (another ex-student of QM) pointed out another article in the International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management, Vol 74, Number 1, February 2008 issue, the title; ‘Confronting the Matrix:Do the IBA Rules Require Amendment to Deal with the Challenges Posed by Electronically Stored Information? by Nicholas Tse and Natasha Peter.

As expected, the answer is a simple ‘yes, the IBA Rules require amendment’ (like the 1st article). The solutions though are not so simple. For me, the solutions are not within the IBA Rules. That’s another story.

Although the second article provided guidance from the English and US amendments and strategies for dealing with problems posed by ESI, the challenges posed by ESI for arbitrators and parties are still in the making or rather unconfronted.

Can one confront the Matrix and maintain a ‘flexible’ IBA Rules?

I wonder how many needle factories are out there?!

E-disclosure -UK

Eventually, this blog will have a Glossary page for ‘all’ terms defined in the rules, guidelines and also their usage in arbitration.

The arbitral tribunal has the power to order disclosure and has a discretion to decide ‘whether any if so which documents or classes of documents should be disclosed between and produced by the parties and at what stage’.

There is no limitation regarding the types of documents. The tribunal must avoid unnecessary expense (section 33(1)(b)) and tailor the order for disclosure to fit the circumstances of the case.

Also for tribunal applying the English procedural law, the new CPR PART 31 and the Practice Direction 31 for the rules on disclosure and electronic disclosure in court proceedings will be relevant